Monday, February 25, 2013

The British Colonial Hotel in Nassau, Bahamas


Robert Morton is a member of the Association Of Former Intelligence Officers and enjoys writing about the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC).

Thursday, February 21, 2013

NIGERIA MAY BECOME NEW U.S. TERRORIST BATTLEGROUND

Note: This article, The Rise of a New Nigerian Militant Group" is republished by OSINT News with permission of Stratfor.

In the past week, 14 foreigners have been kidnapped in northern Nigeria and Cameroon in two separate attacks. No group has claimed responsibility for the second attack, which occurred Feb. 19 in Cameroon, but the location is adjacent to Boko Haram's core territory in northeast Nigeria. Ansaru, a splinter group of Boko Haram, claimed responsibility for the first attack and could be responsible for the second since, unlike Boko Haram, it has a history of kidnapping foreign nationals. If Boko Haram conducted the second attack, it would signal a significant shift in the group's targets and tactics.
 

As Stratfor noted, Boko Haram's capabilities in 2012 were limited to soft targets near the group's base of operations in northeastern Nigeria. Ansaru has emerged over the past year and appears to have surpassed Boko Haram in its range of tactics and targets. Ansaru has relied on armed attacks for kidnappings rather than suicide bombings. Ansaru's targets have included foreigners and those involved with the intervention in Mali, while Boko Haram's targets have been Nigerian.

Nearly all of the Ansaru attacks since December 2012, as well as the unclaimed kidnapping in Cameroon, have targeted French nationals or those supporting French operations in Mali. This has raised the fear that widespread kidnappings will be fallout from the Mali intervention. A continuation of this violence could harm foreign interests in Nigeria and the surrounding countries and strengthen militant jihadism throughout the region.

Ansaru's Origins and Connections

Not a lot is known about the origin of Ansaru, but following Boko Haram's attacks on Kano -- a predominately Muslim city in Nigeria -- that killed almost 200 people in January 2012, Ansaru publicly split from Boko Haram, denouncing the killings of innocent Muslims. However, the group's formation began earlier in connection to two kidnappings.

The first was in May 2011, when a group claiming to be al Qaeda in the Land Beyond the Sahel and a faction of Boko Haram kidnapped two engineers -- one British and one Italian -- in Birnin Kebbi, Nigeria. On Dec. 1, 2011, a video was sent to Agence Nouakchott d'Information, Mauritania's state media outlet, demanding a 5 million-euro (about $6.7 million) ransom. Demanding millions in ransoms is a strategy employed by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; Nigerian militants' demands do not typically reach this level. Agence Nouakchott d'Information is known to have close contacts with al Qaeda's North African branch and served as the mouthpiece for Mokhtar Belmokhtar during the January 2013 attack on the Ain Amenas plant in Algeria. The mediator in the ransom negotiations, Mustafa Ould Limam Chafi, also negotiated many of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's previous hostage ransoms, including the release of U.N. Special Envoy to Niger Robert Fowler, the Canadian diplomat who was kidnapped in Niger in 2008. The connections to Agence Nouakchott d'Information and Chafi suggest that the group responsible for the May 2011 kidnappings in Nigeria -- Ansaru or its predecessor faction within Boko Haram -- has close ties with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.


The man behind the May 2011 operation was trained by Khalid al-Barnawi, whom the U.S. State Department designated a global terrorist in June 2012 because of his ties to Boko Haram and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Al-Barnawi's connection with North African jihadist groups includes time spent with the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, where he worked with Belmokhtar. He also set up kidnapping training camps in Algeria. It is unclear what the link is between al-Barnawi and Ansaru. Some experts have told news media that Abu Usmatul al-Ansari, who claims to be Ansaru's leader, could be a pseudonym for al-Barnawi. Al-Ansari surfaced earlier as Boko Haram's commander in Nigeria's northeastern states, which has been Ansaru's primary area of operation.

The second kidnapping was the January 2012 abduction of a German engineer in Kano. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb claimed responsibility in a video sent to Agence Nouakchott d'Information, but it is more likely that a local group kidnapped the engineer. The hostage was killed during a rescue attempt by German special operations forces in Kano; al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb typically transports hostages to the mountains of northern Mali. According to a Stratfor source, just two weeks after the rescue attempt, the same German special operations forces group targeted a convoy of four cars in northern Nigeria, possibly to disrupt a rumored meeting between a representative of al Shabaab and Abu Zeid, a prominent al Qaeda commander in the Sahel. It is likely that the German special operations forces obtained relevant intelligence in the rescue attempt and acted on it. If such a piece of intelligence was found in Kano, then links between the group behind the operation and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb must be fairly robust, which would mean that al-Barnawi was almost certainly involved with the operation.

Since the death of Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf in 2009, internal tensions have risen between nationalist factions aligned with present Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau and transnational factions. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has long sought a connection with Boko Haram, and it appears that the group has established ties with Ansaru and that the tensions between national and transnational factions of Boko Haram led to the split.

Targets and Tactics

Attacks in Nigeria and Cameroon
Ansaru's first claimed attack was in November 2012, when 40 gunmen assailed the Special Anti-Robbery Squad detention facility in Abuja. After claiming responsibility, al-Ansari stated that Ansaru would target foreigners. The next attack was by 30 gunmen on a French company's compound in Katsina, Nigeria, resulting in the kidnapping of a French engineer. Afterwards, al-Ansari said the attack was because of France's support for an intervention in Mali. This was also the first attack against a Western target in the region since the August 2011 Abuja U.N. bombing, which remains Boko Haram's only transnational attack.

In January, Ansaru ambushed a military convoy bound for Mali -- its second consecutive attack with a transnational objective. Ansaru followed this with an abduction of seven foreign nationals in Bauchi, Nigeria, on Feb. 16. While kidnappings of foreigners are rare in northern Nigeria and Boko Haram has never claimed responsibility for one, Ansaru appears to be focusing on kidnapping operations similar to those carried out by al Qaeda's North African branch.
Boko Haram's tactics can be broken down generally into two categories: suicide bombings (typically using vehicle-borne explosives) and motorcycle ambushes. Boko Haram's target set typically constitutes churches, the police, the military, religious leaders and political institutions. Since November 2012, Boko Haram has attacked a church in a military compound in Kaduna state, made an assassination attempt on the emir of Kano and bombed two churches on Christmas Eve. In December 2012, vehicle-borne suicide bombers targeted offices of two international phone service providers, but this was because the companies were assisting authorities, not because Boko Haram was making a move toward international targets.

Ansaru's attacks, on the other hand, have consisted of raids by gunmen against hardened targets. A platoon-sized element typically assaults the compound where hostages will be abducted, or prisoners freed, before withdrawing. Explosives have not been used in Ansaru raids, except to breach barriers. Such attacks require different capabilities and preparations than Boko Haram's suicide bombings do.
It is becoming increasingly clear that Boko Haram and Ansaru have distinct agendas and different tactics and target sets. There is a long history in using militancy to achieve political ends in Nigeria. Boko Haram -- or at least some of its factions -- satisfies political objectives in the north against President Goodluck Jonathan's administration, and two northern senators have been accused of helping the group. At least presently, Ansaru does not appear to have any of these connections. Its operations do not appear to directly influence Nigerian politics.

Boko Haram's use of suicide bombs, car bombs and other attacks means that it remains the more dangerous group overall. However, Ansaru's more transnational scope of attacks means that the group could pose a greater danger to Western targets and could have the ability to coordinate with other groups operating in West Africa.


If ties between the organizations do exist, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb may work more closely with Ansaru in an attempt to orchestrate its activities into a broader strategy. A Boko Haram offshoot with an aggressive stance toward foreign targets within Nigeria could attract like-minded Boko Haram leaders, such as Mamman Nur (the architect of the U.N. compound attack), and increase the complexity of the group's operations. Although Ansaru is not known to use Boko Haram's tactic of suicide bombings, shifting allegiances within Boko Haram-affiliated groups could bring elements into Ansaru that might expand on the current type of operations the group conducts.

Ansaru's development is significant, and while the group has not been responsible for a large number of attacks, its operations reach beyond Nigeria's borders. Ansaru could also extend al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's network farther south, possibly into Cameroon, and the group's rise could easily negate the gains made against militants in northern Mali. Regardless of eventual developments in the region, the risk of kidnappings near northern Nigeria is increasing.

Robert Morton, M.Ed., Ed.S. is a member of the Association Of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) and writes the online Spy series, "Corey Pearson- CIA Spymaster in the Caribbean". His views are his own and do not represent any organization he is a member of.

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Retired CIA Spymaster to speak on his new book

Are you like me...writing a Spy novel? If so, here's a don't miss event. The North Florida Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) Chapter is meeting this coming Saturday, on February 23rd. The guest speaker is Mr. Terry Williams, who has just completed a spy novel that contains episodes of his years of CIA experience.                           


Terry was a CIA Operations Officer with over thirty years' experience conducting and managing covert operations in Asia, Europe and Eastern Europe. He served as Chief of Station in Taipei and Ottawa and as Chief of Base in Shanghai. He was the Deputy Chief of East Asia Division for Counterintelligence and did rotational assignments to the FBI and Capitol Hill. Prior to his tenure at the CIA, Williams served in the Peace Corps in Bogota, Colombia, taught at the University of San Carlos in Guatemala City, taught English to helicopter pilots and mechanics of the Imperial Iranian Air Force, and at a university in Tokyo, Japan.

Cooper's Revenge is his first novel and he is currently writing a sequel, Unit 400, to be released this year. According to an AFIO newsletter announcement, Terry is a treasure trove of career experience. His Agency classmates include John Brennan, the DCI candidate we've been watching on TV. Family and guests are cordially invited as well, so  RSVP to Quiel Begonia at:  qbegonia@comcast.net   or call 904-545-9549 as soon as you can so they can get an accurate head count. Call quick!

MI5 SEEKS RUSSIAN SPECIALIST FOR HIRE

Today, an article in Russia's newspaper PravdaRu reports that MI5, Britain's intelligence service, is searching for an expert on Russia. In fact, the MI5 website has posted the vacancy that they want to fill. The vacancy ad titled, "Russian Intelligence Analysts" starts as follows: "The deeper you go into a language the more you uncover."
 
The MI5 ad further states, "Using your specialist Russian language skills and your knowledge of Russia's cultural affairs, history, politics, ideology and economy, you will add real understanding to the intelligence that has been gathered and deliver clear analysis in a variety of ways. Your work will enable us to take a well-informed view of potential threats to national security, including terrorism and espionage." 
 
 
The knowledge of Russian is one of the necessary qualities. A job seeker can take a language test right on the website of the intelligence service. "Whether you developed your Russian language skills through academic study, in the workplace or while living or working abroad, you have a genuine passion for languages. You'll thrive on the challenge of applying your Russian language skills on a daily basis to provide expert support to investigative officers," the job description runs. For this job, MI5 needs only British citizens, whose parents are also British. Applicants are also required to reside in the country for the past nine years.
 
Robert Morton, M.Ed., Ed.S. is a member of the Association Of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) and writes the online Spy series "Corey Pearson, CIA Spymaster in the Caribbean." The views expressed on this site do not represent those of any organization he is a member of. Contact him on the Secure Contact Form

Wednesday, February 13, 2013

U-2 SPY PLANES SHADOW OUR ENEMIES

 
     In a BBC special entitled, "James May on the Moon", James May from Top Gear U.K. is taken on an emotional ride to the edge of space in a U-2 spy plane. The Lockheed U-2, nicknamed "Dragon Lady", is a single-engine, very high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft operated by the United States Air Force and previously flown by the Central Intelligence Agency. It provides day and night, very high-altitude (70,000 feet / 21,000 meters), all-weather surveillance. The aircraft is also used for electronic sensor research and development, satellite calibration, and satellite data validation.
35 U-2 spy planes remain active!
35 U-2 spy planes remain active
Eighty-six U-2's were built and 35 remain active. Even though the U.S. Air Force and Navy would eventually fly the U-2, it was originally a CIA operation, run through the Office of Scientific Intelligence. Due to the political implications of a military aircraft invading a country's airspace, only CIA U-2s conducted overflights. The pilots had to resign their military commissions before joining the CIA as civilians, a process they referred to as "sheep dipping". As with CIA involvement, besides the normal construction and serial number for each aircraft produced, each U-2 also has an "Article Number" assigned, and each U-2 would be referred to with its article number on classified internal documents/memos.

Order online
     I found a reliable resource about the U-2, a book entitled, "REMEMBERING THE DRAGON LADY, Memories of the Men Who Shaped History In Support of the U-2 Spy Plane". It is co-authored by Brig. Gen. Geral E. Mcllmoyle, now retired, and is a collection of experiences, anecdotes and memories of 80 Air Force men and their families. In addition, the book contains experiences of U-2 pilots of the Royal Air Force and Republic of China Air Force.

     The book was introduced in May 2008 at the last reunion of the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing veterans and their families and has continued to be a successful recollection of history-making events during the Cold War era, including the Cuban Missile Crisis. 


     Here's an excerpt: "In 1951, modified bombers began overflights of the Soviet Union, and a number of border flights were shot down. At that time, the planners imagined a high altitude aircraft hard to detect and impossible to shoot down. 
     Flying the aircraft was not for the faint of heart; in fact, it was considered one of the most challenging aircraft in the inventory to fly and required a high degree of skill and ability from its pilots. The difficulty experienced by seasoned pilots who flew the U-2 resulted in it being nicknamed "Dragon Lady" meaning the aircraft was extremely unforgiving. Dragon Lady pilots were the first to fly and cruise above 70,000 feet; they were the first to fly with a pressure suit; and they were the first to gather intelligence information in many of the world's hot spots.
     So, what do the finest pilots eat while flying missions that last 12 hours or more? Sgt. Suzzett Stalesky—an airspace physiologist and U-2 launch and recovery technician— says they eat "tube food". According to Stalesky, most pilots eat about a tube per hour and really have to watch out their food intake because they are not allowed to defecate in the suit. Their favorite tubed food: caffeinated chocolate pudding, which gives them a little kick while they are in the aircraft, and chicken a la king.
     Other foods include peaches, hash browns with bacon, cinnamon applesauce, and key lime pie. Stalesky says that they have a chef creating new stuff and, once the pilots give the OK, they will start putting them in production.

Robert Morton, M.Ed., Ed.S. is a member of the Association Of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) and writes the online Spy series "Corey Pearson, CIA Spymaster in the Caribbean." The views expressed on this site do not represent those of any organization he is a member of. Contact him on the Secure Contact Form

Friday, February 8, 2013

IRANIAN LEADERS AT EACH OTHER'S THROATS

I obtained permission to publish an article by George Friedman, called "THE REAL STRUGGLE IN IRAN AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. DIALOGUE". I am republishing this in-depth article and give all credit to Stratfor. The article was written as if it were 2009 during the morbid treatment of protesters during the Iranian political campaign.
 
 
During that time, U.S. President Barack Obama said, "We don't yet know how any potential dialogue will have been affected until we see what has happened inside of Iran." On the surface that is a strange statement, since we know that with minor exceptions, the 2009 demonstrations in Tehran lost steam after Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for them to end and security forces asserted themselves. By the conventional wisdom, those events in Iran represented an oppressive regime crushing a popular rising.
 
It was odd that the U.S. president would raise the question of what has happened in Iran. In reality, Obama's point is well taken because the real struggle in Iran has not yet been settled, nor was it ever settled about the liberalization of the regime. Let me explain-it has been about the role of the clergy -- particularly the old-guard clergy -- in Iranian life, and the future of particular personalities among this clergy.
 
Ahmadinejad ran his re-election campaign against this old clerical elite, charging them with corruption, luxurious living and running the state for their own benefit rather than that of the people. He particularly targeted Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, an extremely senior leader, and his family. Indeed, during the demonstrations, Rafsanjani's daughter and four other relatives were arrested, held and then released a day later.
 
Rafsanjani represents the class of clergy that came to power in 1979. He served as president from 1989-1997, but Ahmadinejad defeated him in 2005. Rafsanjani carries enormous clout within the system as head of the regime's two most powerful institutions -- the Expediency Council, which arbitrates between the Guardian Council and parliament, and the Assembly of Experts, whose powers include oversight of the supreme leader. Forbes has called him one of the wealthiest men in the world. Rafsanjani, in other words, remains at the heart of the post-1979 Iranian establishment.
 
Ahmadinejad expressly ran his presidential campaign against Rafsanjani, using the latter's family's vast wealth to discredit Rafsanjani along with many of the senior clerics who dominate the Iranian political scene. It was not the regime as such that he opposed, but the individuals who currently dominate it. Ahmadinejad wanted to retain the regime, but he desired to repopulate the leadership councils with clerics who share his populist values and want to revive the ascetic foundations of the regime. The Iranian president constantly contrasts his own modest lifestyle with the opulence of the current religious leadership.
 

Recognizing the threat Ahmadinejad represented to him personally and to the clerical class he belongs to, Rafsanjani fired back at Ahmadinejad, accusing him of having wrecked the economy. At his side were other powerful members of the regime, including Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani, who has made no secret of his antipathy toward Ahmadinejad and whose family links to the Shiite holy city of Qom give him substantial leverage. The underlying issue was about the kind of people who ought to be leading the clerical establishment. The battlefield was economic: Ahmadinejad's charges of financial corruption versus charges of economic mismanagement leveled by Rafsanjani and others.

When Ahmadinejad defeated Mir Hossein Mousavi on the night of the election, the clerical elite saw themselves in serious danger. The margin of victory Ahmadinejad claimed might have given him the political clout to challenge their position. Mousavi immediately claimed fraud, and Rafsanjani backed him up. Whatever the motives of those in the streets, the real action was a knife fight between Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani. By the end of the week, Khamenei decided to end the situation. In essence, he tried to hold things together by ordering the demonstrations to halt while throwing a bone to Rafsanjani and Mousavi by extending a probe into the election irregularities and postponing a partial recount by five days.

The Struggle Within the Regime
The key to understanding the situation in Iran is realizing that we have not seen not an uprising against the regime, but a struggle within the regime. Ahmadinejad is not part of the establishment, but rather has been struggling against it, accusing it of having betrayed the principles of the Islamic Revolution. The post-election unrest in Iran therefore was not a matter of a repressive regime suppressing liberals (as in Prague in 1989), but a struggle between two Islamist factions that are each committed to the regime, but opposed to each other.

The demonstrators certainly included Western-style liberalizing elements, but they also included adherents of senior clerics who wanted to block Ahmadinejad's re-election. And while Ahmadinejad undoubtedly committed electoral fraud to bulk up his numbers, his ability to commit unlimited fraud was blocked, because very powerful people looking for a chance to bring him down were arrayed against him.

The situation is even more complex because it is not simply a fight between Ahmadinejad and the clerics, but also a fight among the clerical elite regarding perks and privileges -- and Ahmadinejad is himself being used within this infighting. The Iranian president's populism suits the interests of clerics who oppose Rafsanjani; Ahmadinejad is their battering ram. But as Ahmadinejad increases his power, he could turn on his patrons very quickly. In short, the political situation in Iran is extremely volatile, just not for the reason that the media portrayed.

Rafsanjani is an extraordinarily powerful figure in the establishment who clearly sees Ahmadinejad and his faction as a mortal threat. Ahmadinejad's ability to survive the unified opposition of the clergy, election or not, is not at all certain. But the problem is that there is no unified clergy. The supreme leader is clearly trying to find a new political balance while making it clear that public unrest will not be tolerated. Removing "public unrest" (i.e., demonstrations) from the tool kits of both sides may take away one of Rafsanjani's more effective tools. But ultimately, it actually could benefit him. Should the internal politics move against the Iranian president, it would be Ahmadinejad -- who has a substantial public following -- who would not be able to have his supporters take to the streets.

The View From the West
The question for the rest of the world is simple: Does it matter who wins this fight? We would argue that the policy differences between Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani are minimal and probably would not affect Iran's foreign relations. This fight simply isn't about foreign policy.

Rafsanjani has frequently been held up in the West as a pragmatist who opposes Ahmadinejad's radicalism. Rafsanjani certainly opposes Ahmadinejad and is happy to portray the Iranian president as harmful to Iran, but it is hard to imagine significant shifts in foreign policy if Rafsanjani's faction came out on top. Khamenei has approved Iran's foreign policy under Ahmadinejad, and Khamenei works to maintain broad consensus on policies. Ahmadinejad's policies were vetted by Khamenei and the system that Rafsanjani is part of. It is possible that Rafsanjani secretly harbors different views, but if he does, anyone predicting what these might be is guessing.

Rafsanjani is a pragmatist in the sense that he systematically has accumulated power and wealth. He seems concerned about the Iranian economy, which is reasonable because he owns a lot of it. Ahmadinejad's entire charge against him is that Rafsanjani is only interested in his own economic well-being. These political charges notwithstanding, Rafsanjani was part of the 1979 revolution, as were Ahmadinejad and the rest of the political and clerical elite. It would be a massive mistake to think that any leadership elements have abandoned those principles.

When the West looks at Iran, two concerns are expressed. The first relates to the Iranian nuclear program, and the second relates to Iran's support for terrorists, particularly Hezbollah. Neither Iranian faction is liable to abandon either, because both make geopolitical sense for Iran and give it regional leverage.
 

Tehran's primary concern is regime survival, and this has two elements. The first is deterring an attack on Iran, while the second is extending Iran's reach so that such an attack could be countered. There are U.S. troops on both sides of the Islamic Republic, and the United States has expressed hostility to the regime. The Iranians are envisioning a worst-case scenario, assuming the worst possible U.S. intentions, and this will remain true no matter who runs the government.

We do not believe that Iran is close to obtaining a nuclear weapon, a point we have made frequently. Iran understands that the actual acquisition of a nuclear weapon would lead to immediate U.S. or Israeli attacks. Accordingly, Iran's ideal position is to be seen as developing nuclear weapons, but not close to having them. This gives Tehran a platform for bargaining without triggering Iran's destruction, a task at which it has proved sure-footed.

In addition, Iran has maintained capabilities in Iraq and Lebanon. Should the United States or Israel attack, Iran would thus be able to counter by doing everything possible to destabilize Iraq -- bogging down the remaining U.S. forces there -- while simultaneously using Hezbollah's global reach to carry out terror attacks. After all, Hezbollah is today's al Qaeda on steroids. The radical Shiite group's ability, coupled with that of Iranian intelligence, is substantial.

We see no likelihood that any Iranian government would abandon this two-pronged strategy without substantial guarantees and concessions from the West. Those would have to include guarantees of noninterference in Iranian affairs. Obama, of course, has been aware of this bedrock condition, which is why he went out of his way before the election to assure Khamenei in a letter that the United States had no intention of interfering.

Though Iran did not hesitate to lash out at CNN's coverage of the protests, the Iranians know that the U.S. government doesn't control CNN's coverage. But Tehran takes a slightly different view of the BBC. The Iranians saw the depiction of the demonstrations as a democratic uprising against a repressive regime as a deliberate attempt by British state-run media to inflame the situation. This allowed the Iranians to vigorously blame some foreigner for the unrest without making the United States the primary villain.

But these minor atmospherics aside, we would make three points. First, there was no democratic uprising of any significance in Iran. Second, there is a major political crisis within the Iranian political elite, the outcome of which probably tilts toward Ahmadinejad but remains uncertain. Third, there will be no change in the substance of Iran's foreign policy, regardless of the outcome of this fight. The fantasy of a democratic revolution overthrowing the Islamic Republic -- and thus solving everyone's foreign policy problems a la the 1991 Soviet collapse -- has passed.

That means that Obama, as the primary player in Iranian foreign affairs, must now define an Iran policy -- particularly given Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak's meeting in Washington with U.S. Middle East envoy George Mitchell this Monday. Obama has said that nothing that has happened in Iran makes dialogue impossible, but opening dialogue is easier said than done. The Republicans consistently have opposed an opening to Iran; now they are joined by Democrats, who oppose dialogue with nations they regard as human rights violators. Obama still has room for maneuver, but it is not clear where he thinks he is maneuvering. The Iranians have consistently rejected dialogue if it involves any preconditions. But given the events of the past weeks, and the perceptions about them that have now been locked into the public mind, Obama isn't going to be able to make many concessions.

It would appear to us that in this, as in many other things, Obama will be following the Bush strategy -- namely, criticizing Iran without actually doing anything about it. And so he goes to Moscow more aware than ever that Russia could cause the United States a great deal of pain if it proceeded with weapons transfers to Iran, a country locked in a political crisis and unlikely to emerge from it in a pleasant state of mind..
End of article

Note: I did some research on Iran's power structure. Here's a brief summary of the two major players and their past behaviors:

The Expediency Discernment Council of the System (Persian: مجمع تشخیص مصلحت نظام), is an administrative assembly appointed by the Supreme Leader and was created upon the revision to the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran on 6 February 1988. It was originally set up to resolve differences or conflicts between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians, but "its true power lies more in its advisory role to the Supreme Leader." According to Hooman Majd, the Leader "delegated some of his own authority to the council — granting it supervisory powers over all branches of the government" — following President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's election in 2005.

The Assembly of Experts (also Assembly of Experts of the Leadership) of Iran (Persian: مجلس خبرگان رهبری, Majles-e-Khobregan or Majles-e-Khebregan), is a deliberative body of 86 Mujtahids (Islamic scholars) that is charged with electing and removing the Supreme Leader of Iran and supervising his activities. Members of the assembly are elected from a government-screened list of candidates by direct public vote to eight-year terms. Current laws require the assembly to meet for at least two days, twice annually. The current chairman of the Assembly is Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was elected in September 2007.

On September 4, 2007, the 86-seat body elected chairman of the Expediency Council, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, as its new chairman. Rafsanjani, 73, replaced the assembly's former chairman, the late Ayatollah Ali Meshkini who passed away on July 30, 2007, at the age of 86 due to pulmonic disease.

Rafsanjani urges calm ahead of presidential election
Chairman of the Experts Assembly Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani on Tuesday urged all political parties and groups to keep the country's political atmosphere calm and quiet ahead of the presidential election.

Addressing the Assembly of Experts, he underlined the need for calm in preparation for the presidential elections to be held next year.

Rafsanjani also called for closer relations between the nation and government and underscored the importance of materialization of people's will.

Lauding great efforts made by the Experts Assembly in the past 30 years, he said the assembly, far from any political tension, fulfilled its commitments following the demise of the late Founder of he Islamic Republic and could successfully chose the best possible personality for the important post of the country's leadership.

He referred to the Experts Assembly as the key for the people's tranquility and the country's stability.

The fourth Assembly of Experts convened at the former premises of the Islamic Consultative Assembly this morning.

Experts Assembly consists of 86 members who are directly elected by national voting. It holds meeting twice a year to study major national issues.

The Assembly of Experts is an influential body in charge of administrative affairs of the leadership of the Islamic Revolution and making recommendations to the Supreme Leader on major political and economic policy making.

 
Robert Morton, M.Ed., Ed.S. is a member of the Association For Intelligence Officers (AFIO) and writes about the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). A portion of Ad revenues generated on this site is donated to the AFIO. His ideas are his own and do not represent those of any organization he's a member of. We will publish your ideascomments at no charge...for the good of the order! Contact us on the Secure Contact Form

Tuesday, February 5, 2013

SPY AGENCY SCHOLARSHIPS FOR STUDENTS

According to an article in Florida Today that featured Gene Poteat of the AFIO, the battle against radical Islam and terrorism will continue for a long while. As a member of the Association Of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), I have attended seminars in Tyson Corner, VA that Poteat has sponsored.


He is an interesting and knowledgeable guy. Poteat  developed missile guidance in the 1950s on the Space Coast and knew little about the U.S. Intelligence Community or the CIA. As an engineer with Bell Telephone Laboratories, he had a crucial skill needed to keep track of Soviet missile development during the Cold War. Not surprisingly, the CIA tried to talk him into joining them, but he didn't know who they were! Now, as president of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, Poteat said the best place to get that (expertise) was in the area of Cape Canaveral, and he was lucky enough to be one of those people that was interviewed when he worked at the Cape. Poteat spoke at last Saturday's AFIO Florida Satellite Chapter meeting at Indian River Colony Club, where he detailed moments in history when espionage played an important role behind the scenes.

I'm proud to be one of the 5,000 members of the AFIO since its major objective is to create interest in high school and college students for U.S. intelligence careers. For example, the Florida Satellite Chapter, where Poteat spoke, connects and mentors students in Brevard County and is expanding its outreach. According to Jack Lee, vice president of the Brevard-based chapter with about 40 members, “We are trying to revitalize the chapter. We are in the process of forming a speakers’ bureau of qualified people that will go out and speak to civic organizations, schools and career fairs. We try to identify individual students who may be interested in pursuing intelligence as a career and hope to be able to help support them in some manner of stipend of scholarship.”

At the AFIO chapter meeting, Poteat lectured on how good spy craft changed the outcome of past military conflicts.  Florida Tech students attended the lecture- students who are studying aviation security. Florida Tech has offered the graduate course for a decade, and it must constantly adapt to changes as the war on terrorism evolves. “Bad guys are getting smarter every day,” said Paris Michaels, Florida Tech professor. “They are savvy and a very sophisticated enemy, so we try to meet that level of sophistication. We are talking about students who are going into a field that is on the front line and no one really knows how to do it. The threat keeps changing.”


Poteat believes the war on terrorism is being fought more on an intelligence battlefield than any previous conflict and presents unique challenges. He added, “This war is a lot more dangerous and difficult than the Cold War ever was because you have an enemy now that doesn’t wear a uniform, they hide among the civilians and they love to die to kill you.” 

Robert Morton, M.Ed., Ed.S. is a member of the Association Of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) and writes the online Spy series, "Corey Pearson, CIA Spymaster in the Caribbean". The views expressed on this site do not represent those of any organization he is a member of. We're always looking for different perspectives regarding the Intelligence Community- got a thought, article or comment you'd like to submit? Reach us on the secure Contact Form